

criminal convictions before they had entered the Army, more than half of them for breaking and entering. After joining, these same men committed an average of 2.5 offenses, most of which occurred while they were deserters or AWOL from training while on the continent. They were apparently unable to withstand the monotony and "hurry and wait" of routine training, but there was no lack of bravery under fire. The 100 ex-service prisoners at Maidstone exhibited almost the same characteristics as the Dartmouth men: in the Armed Forces they continued the criminal behavior pattern already established in civil life, and in the post-war society, unable to face the disorganized conditions to which they returned, they again took the easy way out. The analysis of the Borstal boys is of special interest. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, about two-thirds of the Borstal boys were released from the institutions and about seventy per cent of them were inducted into the Army. Despite their progressive institutional life they did not respond to army discipline. Apparently the disturbed and unstable conditions of their childhood unsuited them for military duty.

The final portion of *Crime and the Services* recounts the careers of 200 imprisoned men who had entered military service after their discharge from civil prisons. The behavior of these men follows the same general pattern as those at Dartmouth, Maidstone, and the Borstals, and demonstrates the futility of permitting men who have long criminal records or those with marked delinquent traits to enter the Armed Services. They lacked that important quality so prized by the British as "sticktuitiveness."

Mr. Spencer has shown that neither enlistment in nor discharge from the Services is an antidote to delinquency. Civil authorities and the military obviously cannot shift the burden of rehabilitating the maladjusted serviceman to each other. If a nation engages in total war the problem of crime must be met on a total basis, in both the civil community and the military, employing the best knowledge and services the nation can provide.

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N.A.T.O. AND ITS PROSPECTS. By Wing-Commander J. D. Warne. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1954. Pp. vii, 110. \$3.00.

THIS small volume by a British officer who has served with both NATO and the United Nations is an acute personal analysis of the capacity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to function effectively. It is a valuable report on inter-allied mobilization for defense, if for no other reason than that it poses concretely the issues of resource contribution and distribution. Irrespective of one's agreement or disagreement with the author's conclusions, the book is a healthy contrast to many official documents which are the product of semantic compromise.

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This country has been the beneficiary of similar semi-personal studies on domestic problems of mobilization. Shortly after World War II there appeared a series of monographs dealing quite candidly with such problems and attempted solutions. Although published by the Government Printing Office and written largely by civil servants on "Government time," to the amazement of many they were not mere apologia. Some of the monographs were too descriptive, but this is hard to avoid when particular authors had not personally experienced the real pressures of the programs considered. The most significant of the monographs were a set of fifteen in the price control field,¹ developed under the editorship of Harvey J. Mansfield, now professor of government at Ohio State.

Unfortunately but few copies of the price control monographs were put to use when the Korean mobilization of 1950 came upon us. Part of this misfortune arose out of the anti-OPA bias in certain Administration circles, but much more was due to their physical unavailability. Eventually discovery of the value of the monographs led to the reproduction of many, and in 1952 to a decision to attempt another program of historical analysis covering the Korean program. A few of the new monographs were completed in early 1953, but lack of funds made Government reproduction impossible. Important monographs in the materials allocation and rent areas fortunately had been reproduced earlier, and a labor union bore the expense of printing a volume on wage regulation. In the Autumn of 1954, *Law and Contemporary Problems* published in revised and shortened form eight of the monographs on the major policy problems of Korean price control,² and more recently the *Indiana Law Journal* has given seventy-eight pages to a summary version of the outstanding report on coordination of wage and price control.³

The literature on international mobilization is meager; yet one of the major obstacles to a functioning European alliance is the resolution of numerous supply-price problems. That these already abound is suggested by the repeated recommendations from the military commanders for a counterpart "economic Eisenhower." The Financial and Economic Board, the Defense Production Board, and the Temporary Council Committee of NATO were steps in this direction. In some quarters it was hoped that the European Defense Community (EDC) presented the answer to organization for economic coordination, but with its failure to become a reality, efforts along NATO or possibly other allied lines become more pressing.

It is conceivable that NATO's economic efforts might go beyond the international supply-price problem. That problem alone contains implications for resource allocation between NATO and non-NATO countries, allocations between the different parts of NATO, particularly since the concept of "North

1. Usually referred to as "Historical Reports on War Administration."

2. Symposium, *Price Control In A Cold War*, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 475-684. See also *Symposium on the Mobilization Base*, 13 FED. B.J. 141 (1953); Symposium, *Price Control: Prospect and Retrospect*, 38 IOWA L. REV. 209-333 (1953).

3. Kaufmann, *The Problem of Coordinating Price and Wage Programs in 1950-53*, 29 IND. L.J. 499-537 (1954); 30 *id.* 18-58.

Atlantic" appears ever-expanding, and determinations of the civilian share of national production. It could even affect such matters as taxation, wages, currency convertibility, customs, and living standards. Certainly it involves searching organizational questions, such as whether a military alliance is the most appropriate vehicle for effective economic collaboration.

Attempts at economic coordination cannot, of course, avoid consideration of the destructiveness of new weapons, any more than can efforts toward military collaboration. In this country the domestic aspect of this new factor has been reflected in the planning activities of the Office of Defense Mobilization, the successor agency to the National Security Resources Board. In general, this planning considers (1) the kind of problems posed by the Korean experience, (2) those raised by the conventional full-scale World War II type of mobilization, (3) full scale mobilization required by an atomic attack upon the continental United States, and various modifications of each of these.⁴

But these more speculative factors flowing from the destructiveness of new weapons should not be permitted to impair examination of changing economic and political developments, which, of course, have relevance to the atomic attack situation, but which have major bearing on Government programs for the Korea-type or full-scale World War II type mobilization. For example, at the present time the American stockpile of strategic and critical materials is far more favorable than at any time in the past; the "mobilization base," or capacity to produce defense goods, is at its peak; both personal and corporate liquid assets are substantial; and, except for particular areas, the level of employment and wages is quite high. These new phenomena undoubtedly will make a difference in the operation of any future mobilization program in which this country participates, irrespective of whether the new weapons are employed.

Commander Warne persuasively suggests that a full-blown operating NATO has a long way to go, and that the only way major objectives can be achieved is by having the Organization continually bite off bits and chunks, preferably of a size that it is capable of digesting. These conclusions sound as though they come from a man fully aware of the development of Parliament's power, and perhaps too that of our Federal Union. If NATO does this kind of nibbling successfully in the economic sphere, the generals may well become political leaders by default, leaving the civilian politicians behind to argue the merits of a movement which is already in progress. War, we say, is too important a matter to turn over to the generals alone; in this century the generals may come to conclude that economic preparedness is too important to leave to the politicians alone.

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4. DEFENSE MOBILIZATION: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION (Oct. 1, 1953). See also Durham and Caplan, *Stabilization Planning under the National Security Act*, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 477 (1954).

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The Journal dedicates this issue to the memory of
DEAN HARRY SHULMAN